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Abstract
We rst investigate whether or not ex post destruction can possibly alleviate
the hold-up problem in a one-shot game between a supplier and a buyer. The
answer is yes but only when the buyer believes that the supplier might be a
Homo reciprocans agent with suciently strong propensity for reciprocity. Un-
der incomplete information with informed supplier, investment is made feasible
by the \mismatch" between the buyer's belief of stronger supplier reciprocal
propensity and a de facto weaker one. Under incomplete information with
uninformed supplier, the \mismatch" between the buyer's belief of weaker sup-
plier reciprocal propensity and a stronger ex post one results in \destruction."
Thereafter, we inquire how eective the alleviation can be. We nd out that
the degree of eciency improvement is positively correlated with the inten-
sity of potential ex post destruction for the case of uninformed supplier while
non-monotonically correlated with the buyer's prior belief about the supplier's
uninformedness.
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1 Introduction
According to Che and Sakovics (2008), \hold-up arises when part of the return on
an agent's relationship-specic investments is ex post expropriable by his trading
partner." With an incomplete contract, which arises due to such causes as unfore-
seen contingencies and the enforcement problem, relationship-specic investments are
typically distorted by the hold-up problem and therefore inecient.
The main stream literature on hold-up assumes that human beings are Homo
economicus agents who maximize their own ex post monetary payos. Therefore, the
parties end up with non-trade payos (outside option) if ex post negotiation breaks
down. However, the real world is actually lled with stories of \destruction" that
makes both parties worse o than in non-trade. For example, Sobel (2005) points
out that some recently red employees engage in sabotage activities, costly for both
the employers and the employees, such as ruining computer systems before they leave
their oces.
In general, empirical studies of social behaviors indicate that human beings are
mostly Homo reciprocans agents who are willing to engage in destructive behaviors
at their own costs to punish the perceived perpetrators. There are some studies
that compare games with and without added punishment schemes. For example,
Fehr and Gachter (2000) report the empirical evidence that prospects of cooperation
will be greatly improved if there exists an option to punish defectors, even though
punishments are costly for the punishers in a one-shot context.1
Two main questions of our inquiry are: can the option of ex post destruction in
general enhance ex ante eciency? If yes, how eective can be the enhancement? We
construct a simple hold-up game in the following context : (1) only one party (the
supplier) invests ex ante; (2) the other party (the buyer) makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oer during the ex post negotiation; (3) the supplier has the option of destruction if
the ex post negotiation breaks down.2
Logically, under complete information, if the supplier is a Homo economicus agent
who maximizes her own ex post payo, she will never conduct costly destruction.3
1Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) investigate a modied version of the game \So Long,
Sucker," invented by John Nash, in which the subsequent players incur some monetary costs to
punish the rst movers. They show that there exists a sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) if
the marginal costs for the subsequent players are \swamped by the sweetness of revenge."
2There are some literature studying the ultimatum game preceded by a sunk cost investment of
the responder (supplier). For instance, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) conduct experiments to
study the mitigation of the hold-up through communication. In their experimental setting, if the ex
post negotiation breaks down, both parties get zero, leaving the seller with a net loss. In contrast,
with option of destruction in our setting, if the ex post negotiation breaks down, both parties could
end up with a net loss, including the buyer.
3Ng's (2011) conclusion that the ex post ability to destroy the relationship-specic investment
can solve the hold-up problem is based on the assumption of supplier indierence. Only when the
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If, instead, the supplier is a Homo reciprocans agent who will reject an oer below
her threshold and engage in some destructive behavior, then the buyer may have an
incentive to propose an oer greater than or equal to the threshold to induce the
supplier to invest ex ante.
However, is Homo reciprocans condition alone sucient? The answer is no. We
nd out that the hold-up problem can be possibly solved only when the buyer believes
that the supplier has a suciently strong propensity for reciprocity. Specically, under
complete information, only if the supplier reciprocal propensity is strong enough to
cover the investment cost, will the supplier invest. In contrast, under incomplete
information with informed supplier, investment is made feasible by the \mismatch"
between the buyer's belief of stronger supplier reciprocal propensity and a de facto
weaker one. Under incomplete information with uninformed supplier, the \mismatch"
between the buyer's belief of weaker supplier reciprocal propensity and a stronger ex
post one results in \destruction."
We nd out further that the degree of eciency improvement is positively corre-
lated with the intensity of potential ex post destruction for the case of uninformed
supplier while non-monotonically correlated with the buyer's prior belief about the
supplier's uninformedness.
Our paper is related to the literature of behavioral game theory, which suggests
that fairness (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) or reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
2004) may aect ineciency of the hold-up problem. For example, Dufwenberg,
Smith, and Van Essen (2013) argue that vengeance (negative reciprocity) may allevi-
ate the ineciency caused by the hold-up problem, provided that the investor holds
the residual rights of control once ex post negotiation breaks down.4 von Siemens
(2009) investigates a model of private information in which the seller5 knows her own
type as either \selsh" or \fair-minded." Therefore the seller's investment plays a role
of signalling that entails behavioral costs as the major incentive for investment.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
settings. Section 3 discusses the case of complete information, in which both the sup-
plier and the buyer are informed about the supplier's reciprocal propensity. Section 4
discusses the case of incomplete information with informed and uninformed supplier
supplier is indierent between destructing and not destructing, will she destruct, which is in fact
non-trade since it incurs no additional cost for the supplier.
4In Dufwenberg, Smith, and Van Essen (2013), the residual value for the investor (player 1) is
normalized to zero, while the residual value for the opponent (player 2) is (1 )v2, where  2 [0; 1].
If ex post negotiation breaks down, player 1 punishes player 2 at player 1's own cost by forgoing the
\consolation payo" t, which is less than the residual value.
5Equivalent to the supplier in our model.
6von Siemens (2009) assumes behavioral costs for the \fair-minded" seller if she accepts the unfair
oer below some threshold. In contrast, we focus on the option of ex post destruction, in which the
supplier rejects an oer below some threshold and engage in some destructive behavior to punish
the buyer at the supplier's own cost.
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respectively. The degree of eciency improvement is discussed in section 5 and 6 for
the intensity of potential ex post destruction and the prior belief about the supplier's
uninformedness respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2 Basic Settings
Consider a trading relationship between a buyer and a supplier, who are both risk
neutral. At date 0, the supplier decides whether or not to make an investment that
costs her c > 0. Investment (I) enables her to split a pie of size m with the buyer in
the subsequent period. Assume there is no discounting and it is socially ecient to
invest, i.e., c < m. If the supplier does not make the investment (O), they both get
nothing.
The timing of the model is as follows. If at date 0 the supplier invests, at date 1
the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer, p  0. Then at the following date 2 the
supplier has three options: to accept the oer (A), to reject the oer (R), or to engage
in some destructive behavior (D). If the supplier accepts the oer, they will split the
pie according to the oer and the game ends. Rejecting an oer ends the game and
they will stay with their own non-trade payos, which are normalized to zero. If the
supplier engages in some destructive behavior (D), the payos for the supplier and
the buyer will be ( X; Y ) on top of their non-trade payos, where X > 0; Y > 0.
The supplier could be a Homo economicus agent or a Homo reciprocans agent.
Specically, if the supplier is a Homo economicus agent, who maximizes her own ex
post payo, the game tree is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Game tree with a Homo economicus supplier
If the supplier is a Homo reciprocans agent, who will reject an oer below some
threshold T 2 (0;m] and engage in some destructive behavior to punish the buyer at
the supplier's own cost, the game tree is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Game tree with a Homo reciprocans supplier
2.1 Information
There are two folds of information: rst whether the supplier is a Homo economicus
or a Homo reciprocans agent; second if she is a Homo reciprocans agent, how high
her threshold for destruction T is. In the following sections, we discuss the complete
information case and incompl te information case respectively. In the case of complete
information, both the supplier and the buyer know whether the supplier is a Homo
economicus or a Homo reciprocans agent, and know the supplier's threshold T if she
is a Homo reciprocans agent.
In contrast, in the incomplete information case, the supplier and the buyer may
not know whether the supplier is a Homo economicus or a Homo reciprocans agent
let alone her threshold T . Suppose the prior belief follows some distribution. Fol-
lowing Fehr and Schmidt (1999), assume with probability s the supplier is Homo
economicus,7 while with probability 1   s she is a Homo reciprocans to various de-
grees T 2 (k;m), which follows some continuous distribution F , with the density
f , where k 2 (0;m). In addition, assume the density function f decreases in T to
capture the idea that the supplier is less likely to be strong Homo reciprocans.8
For incomplete information, there are two sub-cases. 1. In the case of incomplete
information with informed supplier, the supplier knows whether she is a Homo
economicus or a Homo reciprocans agent and her threshold T if she is a Homo re-
ciprocans agent, while the buyer does not, and the buyer knows that the supplier
knows these information. 2. In the case of incomplete information with uninformed
supplier, neither the supplier nor the buyer knows ex ante whether the supplier is
a Homo economicus or a Homo reciprocans agent let alone her threshold T if she is
7It is equivalent to say that for the Homo economicus agent, T = 0.
8In reality, from the supplier's point of view, the \fair" ex post oer from the buyer has to at
least cover the ex ante investment cost. An example of the distribution is the beta distribution:
Beta(1; ; c;m) with the support (c;m), where  > 1.
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a Homo reciprocans agent. In this case, since both the supplier and the buyer are
uninformed, their decisions will be based on their prior beliefs.
3 Complete Information
Now consider the case with complete information: both the supplier and the buyer
know whether the supplier is a Homo economicus or a Homo reciprocans agent, and
know her threshold T if she is a Homo reciprocans agent.
3.1 Homo Economicus Supplier
Suppose the supplier is a Homo economicus agent, and both the supplier and the
buyer know this information. Back to gure 1, as X > 0,  c >  c X. The Homo
economicus supplier will never destruct. Anticipating this, the buyer will only oer
the minimum amount to the supplier.9 Backward to the beginning of the game, as
long as the oer is less than the cost of the investment, there is no incentive for the
Homo economicus supplier to invest ex ante. Therefore, if the supplier is a Homo
economicus agent, who maximizes her own ex post payo, the option of ex post
destruction does not alleviate the ineciency of the hold-up problem.
3.2 Homo Reciprocans Supplier
Suppose the supplier is a Homo reciprocans agent, and both the supplier and the
buyer know that the supplier is a Homo reciprocans agent and her threshold T . Back
to gure 2, the existence of the Homo reciprocans supplier, who will \destruct" if the
oer is less than T , enables the supplier to threaten the buyer not to fully exploit her
ex post. Therefore, the buyer has an incentive to propose an oer p = T ex post.10
Back to the beginning of the game, as long as, T  c, the supplier has the incentive
to invest ex ante. In this case, the intensity of ex post destruction Y (the damage
caused by the destruction to the buyer) is irrelevant because no oer is less than T .
The underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem is only partially solved, as there
is no investment ex ante if T < c.
9As pointed out by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), if there is a smallest money unit , then the buyer
may oer p =  to the supplier ex post, other than p = 0 in the continuous case.
10p > T is not necessary, as p = T is sucient to induce the supplier to \accept" the oer.
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4 Incomplete Information
4.1 Incomplete Information { Informed Supplier
In the case of incomplete information with informed supplier, the supplier knows
whether she is a Homo economicus or a Homo reciprocans agent and knows her
threshold T if she is a Homo reciprocans agent, while the buyer does not, and the
buyer knows that the supplier knows these information. The following proposition
shows that under incomplete information with informed supplier, only if the buyer's
prior belief of the supplier's propensity for reciprocity is suciently strong, will the
supplier have the incentive to invest ex ante.
Proposition 1 In the case of incomplete information with informed supplier, there
exists a p, such that 
D(p) = 0 if D(k)  0
p = 0 if D(k) < 0
where D(p) =  s+ (1  s)[ F (p) + (m  p)f(p)].
If p  c, we have a unique equilibrium, in which the supplier with T  p invests
at date 0 and the buyer oers p = p at date 1; if p < c, we have a unique equilibrium,
in which the supplier does not invest at date 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, under incomplete information with informed supplier, the supplier will
not invest ex ante if she is a Homo reciprocans agent with threshold greater than the
anticipated ex post oer from the buyer at date 1. Therefore, even with the option
of destruction ex post, there will be no destruction at all in equilibrium.
Further, to solve the underinvestment caused by hold-up, there are two conditions.
First of all, the buyer's prior belief of the supplier's propensity for reciprocity has to
be suciently strong, such that p  c. Second, the supplier has to be either a Homo
economicus agent or a Homo reciprocans agent with T  p. That is to say, it is the
\mismatch" between the buyer's belief of stronger supplier reciprocal propensity and
a de facto weaker one that makes the investment feasible.
4.2 Incomplete Information { Uninformed Supplier
In the case of incomplete information with uninformed supplier, neither the sup-
plier nor the buyer knows whether the supplier is a Homo economicus or a Homo
reciprocans agent let alone her threshold T if she is a Homo reciprocans agent. In
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this case, since both the supplier and the buyer are uninformed, their decisions will
be based on their prior belief. The following proposition shows that under incom-
plete information with uninformed supplier, only if the prior belief of the supplier's
propensity for reciprocity is suciently strong, will the supplier have the incentive to
invest ex ante.
Proposition 2 In the case of incomplete information with uninformed supplier, there
exists a p, such that 8><>:
p = m if eD(m) > 0eD(p) = 0 if eD(k)  0  eD(m)
p = 0 if eD(k) < 0
where eD(p) =  s+ (1  s)[ F (p) + (m  p+ Y )f(p)].
If p  c, we have a unique equilibrium, in which the supplier invests at date 0
and the buyer oers p = p at date 1; if p < c, we have a unique equilibrium, in
which the supplier does not invest at date 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, as the supplier is uninformed ex ante, the buyer is willing to oer
more to the supplier ex post, to avoid possible destruction by the supplier. Therefore,
p  p for any Y > 0. In this sense, the possibility of destruction may become an
incentive to enhance eciency in bilateral relationships with hold-up.
Further, to solve the underinvestment caused by hold-up, we only need one condi-
tion: the prior belief of the supplier's propensity for reciprocity has to be suciently
strong, such that p  c. Compared with the informed supplier case in section 4.1,
the condition is relaxed as p  p. Moreover, beyond the ex ante ineciency, we
could have ex post ineciency. If the supplier's ex post realized threshold T > p,
the supplier will reject the oer and engage in some destruction behavior. That is
to say, it is the \mismatch" between the buyer's belief of weaker supplier reciprocal
propensity and a stronger ex post propensity that results in \destruction."
5 How Eective Destruction Intensity Matters?
Now, we turn to inquire how eective the alleviation can be. In this section, we
consider the intensity of potential ex post destruction. In the following section, we
move on to consider the uncertainty of supplier informedness of reciprocal propensity.
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5.1 Complete Information
In the case of complete information, both the supplier and the buyer are informed.
Back to section 3, there is no investment if the supplier is a Homo economicus or a
Homo reciprocans agent with T < c. Even with the option of destruction ex post,
there is no destruction at all in equilibrium. Consequently, the intensity of ex post
destruction Y (the damage caused by the destruction to the buyer) is irrelevant.
5.2 Incomplete Information { Informed Supplier
In the case of incomplete information with informed supplier, the supplier is informed,
while the buyer is not, and the buyer knows that the supplier is informed. The
supplier will not invest ex ante if she is a Homo reciprocans agent with threshold
greater than the anticipated ex post oer from the buyer at date 1. Similar to the
complete information case, even with the option of destruction ex post, there will be
no destruction at all in equilibrium. Subsequently, p is independent of the intensity
of ex post destruction Y . That is, the intensity of ex post destruction is irrelevant,
which is described in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 p is a constant function of Y .
5.3 Incomplete Information { Uninformed Supplier
In the case of incomplete information with uninformed supplier, neither the supplier
nor the buyer is informed ex ante. In this case, their decisions will be based on their
prior belief. The following corollary shows that with uninformed supplier, the more
intense the ex post destruction Y , the more the buyer is willing to oer to the supplier
ex post, to avoid possible destruction by the supplier.
Corollary 2 p is an increasing function of Y . In addition, lim
Y!0
p = p.
Proof. See Appendix.
In another word, the degree of eciency improvement is positively correlated with
the intensity of potential ex post destruction.
6 How Eective Supplier Informedness Uncertainty
Matters?
We move on to consider the uncertainty of supplier informedness of reciprocal propen-
sity. Suppose there is a prior belief that the probability for the supplier to be \unin-
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formed" ex ante is  2 (0; 1) , while the the probability for her to be \informed" ex
ante is 1  .
The following proposition shows that under incomplete information with uncer-
tainty of supplier informedness, only if the prior belief of the supplier's reciprocal
propensity is suciently strong, will the supplier have the incentive to invest ex ante.
Proposition 3 In the case of incomplete information with uncertainty of supplier
informedness, there exists a p, such that8<:
p = m if D(m) > 0
D(p) = 0 if D(k)  0  D(m)
p = 0 if D(k) < 0
where D(p) =  s+ (1  s)[ F (p)] + (1  s)(m  p+ Y )f(p).
if p  c, we have a unique equilibrium, in which informed supplier with T  p and
uninformed supplier invest at date 0 and the buyer oers p = p at date 1; if p < c,
we have a unique equilibrium, in which there is no investment at date 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Similar to corollary 2, the following corollary shows that with uncertainty of sup-
plier informedness, the more intense the ex post destruction Y , the more the buyer is
willing to oer to the supplier ex post, to avoid possible destruction by the uninformed
supplier.
Corollary 3 p is an increasing function of Y .
Proof. See Appendix.
Moreover, the following corollary shows that with uncertainty of supplier informed-
ness, the larger  (the prior probability of \uninformed" suppliers), the more the
buyer is willing to oer to the supplier ex post, to avoid possible destruction by the
uninformed supplier.
Corollary 4 p is an increasing function of . lim
!1
p = p and lim
!0
p = 0  p.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note, the probability for the supplier to be uninformed changes the structure of
the game. The eciency improvement caused by the probability of supplier unin-
formedness changing from 0 to 1 is non-monotonic. Initially, a minute probability
of the supplier being uninformed will cause a sharp drop of the equilibrium oering
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Figure 3: Equilibrium oering from the buyer
and therefore exacerbate the ineciency of underinvestment, which can be alleviated
thereafter only with the threat of ex post destruction by the uninformed supplier.
These are illustrated in Figure 3.
Intuitively, according to the prior, the buyer believes that the supplier is unin-
formed with probability  and informed with probability 1  . There is no way for
the buyer to exploit the informed supplier as the supplier moves rst. In contrast, it
is possible for the buyer to exploit the uninformed supplier by cutting the oer, as
long as the oer is greater than or equal to the ex ante investment cost. Due to this
opportunistic behavior of the buyer, a slim chance for the supplier to be uninformed
will cause a sharp drop of the equilibrium oering.
Therefore, the existence of the uninformed supplier is a double-edged sword. On
the one hand, the option of ex post destruction enhances the likelihood of ex ante
investment; on the other hand a slim chance of existence of uninformed Homo recip-
rocans supplier will cause a sharp drop of the equilibrium oering and subsequently
exacerbate the ineciency of underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem. To
put it in another way, it is because of the existence of the uninformed Homo recip-
rocans supplier, that the option of ex post destruction becomes relevant to make the
remedy.
Still, the underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem is only partially solved,
as there is no investment ex ante if p < c. Further, we could have the ex post
ineciency, beyond the ex ante ineciency. For instance, consider the case that the
buyer believes that the supplier is uninformed with probability : the uninformed
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supplier invests at date 0 and the buyer oers p at date 1. If the supplier's ex post
realized threshold T > p, the uninformed supplier will reject the oer and engage
in some destructive behavior. This can be well justied by the existence of ex post
destruction in the real world.
7 Concluding Remarks
We investigate whether or not and how eective ex post destruction can alleviate the
hold-up problem in a one-shot game between a supplier and a buyer. Given the dis-
tinction between ex post destruction and non-trade, the option of ex post destruction
cannot enhance ex ante eciency if the supplier is a Homo economicus agent under
complete information. However, if the buyer believes that the supplier might be a
Homo reciprocans agent with suciently strong propensity for reciprocity, the prob-
lem can possibly be alleviated. Specically, under complete information, only if the
supplier reciprocal propensity is strong enough to cover the investment cost, will the
supplier invest. In contrast, under incomplete information with informed supplier,
investment is made feasible by the \mismatch" between the buyer's belief of stronger
supplier reciprocal propensity and a de facto weaker one. Under incomplete informa-
tion with uninformed supplier, the \mismatch" between the buyer's belief of weaker
supplier reciprocal propensity and a stronger ex post one results in \destruction."
When it works, the degree of eciency improvement is positively correlated with
the intensity of potential ex post destruction under incomplete information with un-
informed supplier. Further, in the case of incomplete information with uncertainty
of supplier informedness, eciency improvement caused by supplier uninformedness
probability changing from 0 to 1 is non-monotonic. Initially, the minute probability
of the supplier being uninformed will cause a sharp drop of the equilibrium oering
and therefore exacerbate the ineciency of underinvestment, which can be alleviated
thereafter only with the threat of ex post destruction by the uninformed supplier.
That is to say, it is because of the existence of the uninformed Homo reciprocans sup-
plier, that the option of ex post destruction becomes relevant to make the remedy.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the buyer's problem at date 1. Given the supplier invests at date 0, at
date 1 if the buyer oers p, the supplier who is a Homo economicus agent or a Homo
reciprocans agent with T  p will accept the oer. As the supplier is informed, she
will not invest at date 0 if she is a Homo reciprocans agent with T > p.
Suppose at date 0, a supplier who is a Homo economicus agent or a Homo recip-
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rocans agent with T  ep invests, otherwise not. Given this, the buyer's problem at
date 1 is as follows.
max
p
s(m  p) + (1  s) R p
0
(m  p)f(T )mT
s+ (1  s)F (ep)
Note, the buyer will never oer more than ep. Solving the optimization problem above,
we have the rst order condition (FOC) as follows.11
 s+ (1  s)[ F (p) + (m  p)f(p)] = 0 (1)
Denote the left hand side of FOC,  s + (1   s)[ F (p) + (m   p)f(p)] = D(p).
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (p) is an increasing function, and the
density f(p) is a decreasing function as assumed. Clearly, D(p) is decreasing in p. In
addition, when p = m, D(p) =  s  (1  s) =  1 < 0.
If D(k)  0, we can always nd a p 2 [k;m) such that D(p) = 0. Further,
dierentiate D(p) with respect to p and we have
D0(p) = (1  s)

 dF (p)
dp
  f(p) + (m  p) df(p)
dp

= (1  s)

 2f(p) + (m  p) df(p)
dp

 0
where dF (p)
dp
= f(p)  0 and df(p)
dp
 0 as assumed. Thus, the second order condition
is satised.
If D(k) < 0, we end up with a corner solution, either 0 or k. If the buyer oers
p = 0, the expected net benet is sy
s+(1 s)F (ep) , which is greater than the expected net
benet s(m k)
s+(1 s)F (ep) if he oers p = k. Thus, if the prior probability that the supplier
is Homo economicus is high, the buyer will oer 0.
To summarize, the optimal solution of the buyer's problem p is either solving the
FOC above or 0, depending on the prior. Anticipating this, at date 0, the supplier
who is a Homo economicus agent or a Homo reciprocans agent with T  p invests,
provided that p  c. Since the Homo reciprocans supplier will not invest ex ante if
her threshold is greater than the anticipated ex post oer from the buyer at date 1,
there is no destruction at all in equilibrium, even with the option of destruction ex
post. Therefore, if p  c, we have a unique equilibrium, in which the supplier who is
a Homo economicus agent or a Homo reciprocans agent with T  p invests at date
0 and the buyer oers p = p at date 1. If, instead, p < c, the anticipated ex post
oer from the buyer at date 1 does not cover the cost of investment, the supplier will
not invest at date 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
11Here, we ignore the positive constant terms.
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Consider the buyer's problem at date 1. Given the supplier invests at date 0, at
date 1 if the buyer oers p, the supplier who is a Homo economicus agent or a Homo
reciprocans agent with T  p will accept the oer. The Homo reciprocans supplier
with T > p will reject the oer and engage in some destruction behavior.12 The
buyer's problem at date 1 is as follows.
max
p
s(m  p) + (1  s)
Z p
0
(m  p)f(T )mT +
Z m
p
 Y f(T )mT

The rst order condition is
 s+ (1  s)[ F (p) + (m  p+ Y )f(p)] = 0 (2)
Similar to the proof of proposition 1, denote the left hand side of FOC,  s+(1 
s)[ F (p)+(m p)f(p)] = eD(p). F (p) is an increasing function, and the density f(p)
is a decreasing function as assumed. Clearly, eD(p) is decreasing in p.
If eD(k)  0  eD(m), we can always nd a p 2 [k;m) such that eD(p) = 0. Further,
dierentiate eD(p) with respect to p and we have
eD0(p) = (1  s)  dF (p)
dp
  f(p) + (m  p+ Y ) df(p)
dp

= (1  s)

 2f(p) + (m  p) df(p)
dp

 0
where dF (p)
dp
= f(p)  0 and df(p)
dp
 0 as assumed. Thus, the second order condition
is satised.
If eD(k) < 0, we end up with a corner solution, either 0 or k. If the buyer oers
p = 0, the expected net benet is sy   (1  s)Y , which is greater than the expected
net benet s(m   k)   (1   s)Y if he oers p = k. Thus, if the prior probability
that the supplier is Homo economicus is high, the buyer will oer 0. To the opposite,
if eD(m) > 0, again we end up with a corner solution, m. There is no way for the
buyer to oer more than m. Thus, if the prior belief of the supplier's propensity for
reciprocity is suciently strong and the ex post destruction Y is intense, the buyer
will oer m.
To summarize, the optimal solution of the buyer's problem p is either solving the
FOC above, 0, or m, depending on the prior. Based on the prior belief, at date 1 the
buyer oers p. Back to the beginning of the game, as long as p  c, the supplier
has the incentive to invest ex ante.
12Assume, once the buyer makes the take-it-or-leave-it oer, the buyer believes that the reciprocal
propensity of the uninformed supplier will be realized and the uninformed supplier will make decision
based on her true nature as Homo reciprocans, even though she is uninformed ex ante. This says
that one will get to know one's true self in the crucial moment eventually.
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Proof of Corollary 2
Consider the variation of the parameter Y . Take the derivative with respect to Y
on both sides of FOC in proposition 2 (equation 2).
 dF (p)
dp
dp
dY
+

  dp
dY
+ 1

f(p) + (m  p+ Y ) df(p)
dp
dp
dY
= 0
where dF (p)
dp
= f(p). Rearrange and we have
dp
dY
=
f(p)
2f(p)  (m  p+ Y ) df(p)
dp
Since f(p)  0 and df(p)
dp
 0 as assumed, we have dp=dY  0. In addition, lim
Y!0
p =
p, as lim
Y!0
eD(p) = D(p).
Proof of Proposition 3
Let's see the response of the buyer if the supplier invests at date 0. Given the
supplier invests at date 0, at date 1 if the buyer oers p, the supplier who is a Homo
economicus agent or a Homo reciprocans agent with T  p will accept the oer.
The Homo reciprocans supplier with T > p will reject the oer and engage in some
destructive behavior. The informed supplier will not invest at date 0 if T > p.
Suppose at date 0, an informed supplier who is a Homo economicus agent or a
Homo reciprocans agent with T  ep invests, otherwise not. Given this, if the buyer
oers p < ep, the buyer's problem at date 1 is as follows.
max
p
1
 + (1  )[s+ (1  s)F (ep)]



s(m  p) + (1  s)
Z p
0
(m  p)f(T )mT +
Z m
p
 Y f(T )mT

+
(1  )
"
s(m  p) + (1  s)
 Z p
0
(m  p)f(T )mT +
Z ep
p
 Y f(T )mT
!#)
Solving the optimization problem above, we have the rst order condition as follows,
which is the same as equation 2 in proposition 2.13
 s+ (1  s)[ F (p) + (m  p+ Y )f(p)] = 0
From proposition 2, we have p solving the optimization problem above.
Instead, if the buyer oers p  ep, the buyer's problem at date 1 is as follows.
max
p

n
s(m  p) + (1  s)
hR p
0
(m  p)f(T )mT + Rm
p
 Y f(T )mT
io
+ (1  )(m  p)[s+ (1  s)F (ep)]
 + (1  )[s+ (1  s)F (ep)]
13Here, we ignore the positive constant terms.
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Solving the optimization problem above, we have the rst order condition as follows.
 f s+ (1  s)[ F (p) + (m  p+ Y )f(p)]g   (1  )[s+ (1  s)F (ep)] = 0
Similar to the proof of proposition 1 and 2, there exists a bp solving the optimization
problem above. Back to date 0, anticipating the buyer's oer bp, the informed supplier
who is a Homo economicus agent or a Homo reciprocans agent with T  bp will invest,
provided that bp  c. The informed Homo reciprocans supplier with T > bp will not
invest.
We reach an equilibrium till to the point that there exists a p solving the following
equation.
 s+ (1  s)[ F (p)] + (1  s)(m  p+ Y )f(p) = 0 (3)
Similar to the proof of proposition 1 and 2, denote the left hand side of FOC,  s +
(1   s)[ F (p)] + (1   s)(m   p + Y )f(p) = D(p). F (p) is an increasing function,
and the density f(p) is a decreasing function as assumed. Clearly, D(p) is decreasing
in p.
If D(k)  0  D(m), we can always nd a p 2 [k;m) such that D(p) = 0. Further,
dierentiate D(p) with respect to p and we have
D
0
(p) = (1  s)

 dF (p)
dp

+ (1  s)

 f(p) + (m  p+ Y ) df(p)
dp

= (1  s)

 (1 + )f(p) +  (m  p+ Y ) df(p)
dp

 0
where dF (p)
dp
= f(p)  0 and df(p)
dp
 0 as assumed. Thus, the second order condition
is satised.
If D(k) < 0, we end up with a corner solution, either 0 or k. If the buyer oers
p = 0, the expected net benet is fsy (1 s)Y g+(1 )m[s+(1 s)F (ep)]
+(1 )[s+(1 s)F (ep)] , which is greater
than the expected net benet fs(m k) (1 s)Y g+(1 )(m k)[s+(1 s)F (ep)]
+(1 )[s+(1 s)F (ep)] if he oers p = k.
Thus, if the prior probability that the supplier is Homo economicus is large, the buyer
will oer 0. To the opposite, if D(m) > 0, again we end up with a corner solution, m.
There is no way for the buyer to oer more than m. Thus, if the prior belief of the
supplier's propensity for reciprocity is suciently strong and the ex post destruction
Y is intense, the buyer will oer m.
To summarize, the optimal solution of the buyer's problem p is either solving
equation 3, 0, or m, depending on the prior. Based on the prior belief, at date 1 the
buyer oers p. Anticipating these, at date 0, the informed supplier who is a Homo
economicus agent or a Homo reciprocans agent with T  p and uninformed supplier
invest, provided that p  c.
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Proof of Corollary 3
Consider the variation of the parameters Y . Take the derivative with respect to
Y on both sides of equation 3.
 (1  s)dF (p)
dp
@p
@Y
+ (1  s)

  @p
@Y
+ 1

f(p) + (m  p+ Y ) df(p)
dp
@p
@Y

= 0
where dF (p)
dp
= f(p). Rearrange and we have
@p
@Y
=
f(p)
(1 + )f(p)  (m  p+ Y ) df(p)
dp
Since f(p)  0 and df(p)
dp
 0 as assumed, we have @p
@Y
 0.
Proof of Corollary 4
Consider the variation of the parameters . Take the derivative with respect to 
on both sides of equation 3.
 (1  s)dF (p)
dp
@p
@
+ (1  s)(m  p+ Y )f(p) + (1  s)

  @p
@
f(p) + (m  p+ Y ) df(p)
dp
@p
@

= 0
where dF (p)
dp
= f(p). Rearrange and we have
@p
@
=
(m  p+ Y )f(p)
2f(p)   (m  p+ Y ) df(p)
dp
Since f(p)  0 and df(p)
dp
 0 as assumed, we have @p
@
 0. In addition, lim
!1
p = p,
as lim
!1
D(p) = eD(p).
Consider the case  ! 0. Back to the proof of proposition 3, we have the rst
order condition as follows (equation 3).
 s+ (1  s)[ F (p)] + (1  s)(m  p+ Y )f(p) = 0
As  ! 0, the left hand side goes to  s + (1   s)[ F (p)]   s + (1   s)[ F (p) +
(m   p)f(p)] = D(p). It follows that lim
!0
p  p. Further,  s + (1   s)[ F (p)] < 0,
which implies lim
!0
p = 0.
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